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Browsing petitions, lettres de cachets, internment records, and administrative and police 
documents from the beginning of the eighteenth century at the Bibliothèque Nationale, 
Michel Foucault confesses in Vie des hommes infâmes that the reading of these archives 
disconcerts more than any literary text. These documents sealed the fates of ordinary 
individuals – squandered and abused spouses, disobedient young people – such as Jean-
Antoine Tousard, who, after being found guilty of committing sodomy and being an atheist, 
was sent to and confined at the Chateau de Bicêtre on 21 April, 1701. Even though the 
exhumation of ordinary lives, of secondary actors as opposed to historic memorable figures, 
has been anchored in recent historiographical debates and in a renewed interest in the 
archive,1 Foucault did not intend to analyse or decipher their meanings but rather to show how 
they articulated certain norms of their times and reflected the encounter between political 
mechanisms and discourse. From the material observation of the lives etched into these 
archives came the idea of a collection – as opposed to a rational classification – which 
consisted in gathering these ‘poèmes vies’2 according to specific pragmatic and stylistic 
criteria in order to restore their sparkle, intensity and violence:  
 
Les documents que j’ai rassemblés ici sont homogènes ; et ils risquent fort de paraître 
monotones. Tous cependant fonctionnent au disparate. Disparate entre les choses 
racontées et la manière de les dire ; disparate entre ceux qui se plaignent et supplient et 
ceux qui ont sur eux tout pouvoir ; disparate entre l’ordre minuscule des problèmes 
soulevés et l’énormité du pouvoir mis en œuvre ; disparate entre le langage de la 
cérémonie et du pouvoir et celui des fureurs ou des impuissances. Ce sont des textes 
qui regardent vers Racine, ou Bossuet, ou Crébillon ; mais ils portent avec eux toute 
une turbulence populaire, toute une misère et une violence, toute une “bassesse” 
comme on disait, qu’aucune littérature à cette époque n’aurait pu accueillir. Ils font 
apparaître des gueux, des pauvres gens, ou simplement des médiocres, sur un étrange 
théâtre où ils prennent des postures, des éclats de voix, des grandiloquences, où ils 
revêtent des lambeaux de draperie qui leur sont nécessaires s’ils veulent qu’on leur 
prête attention sur la scène du pouvoir. (Foucault 238) 
 
What drew Foucault’s attention to these disparate discourses was that, beyond the contrast 
between the minuscule wrongs of pitiable lives and the grandiloquent rhetoric, they rejected 
the hypostasis of the first person narrative, not only since they were reported in the third 
person singular depriving these men of voices and faces, but also in that their discursive and 
stylistic heterogeneities elicited a lack of clear generic assignation (“ni quasi-, ni ‘sous-
littérature’, ce n’est même pas l’ébauche d’un genre”) (Foucault 253).  
 This ambitious project at the intersection of history and literature, renewing the minor 
genre of the Lives – a tradition that can be traced back to Plutarch and culminating at the 
Renaissance –, had sunk into oblivion but fed into the ideas of subsequent French historians, 
writers and poets. Since the 1990s, literary criticism has indeed noticed a growing interest in 
the interrelation between archives, life and literature in French cultural production. In the 
novel, it tied in with the decline of Structuralism and formal definitions, a return to the ‘real’ 
resulting from literature’s abandonment of the abstraction of the Nouveau Roman that 
favoured new ways of looking at ordinary lives and the emergence of hybrid works 
exploiting, amongst other forms, testimonies, archives or photographs. This new paradigm, 
whose designation remains, amongst critics, debatable (“littérature factographique”,3 
“réalisme contemporain”,4 “le récit factuel”, “littérature non fictionnelle”) is not used by 
contemporary authors to promote a new form of rationality, one similar to the scientific 
method developed by many nineteenth-century authors. Rather, they tend to incorporate a 
self-reflexive awareness of the social sciences to move beyond the epistemic oppositions of 
subjectivity/objectivity, fiction/fact, considering the novel as a space of observation and 
elucidation5 and aligning themselves with Derrida’s conception of the archive as a reflection 
of the real, a central feature of mental lives.6 While, for contemporary novelists, venturing 
into the archives of existing lives shows that there is no need to invent new lives or stories 
when one can dig into what already exists, contemporary French poets devote themselves to 
an opposite paradigm: to re-enact or ‘redescribe’ a wide range of documents (statements 
alleging sexual assault, testimonies, minutes of war crime reports, etc.), all linked to the 
public arena, through a process of decontextualization/recontextualization via new layouts, 
visual arrangements or media. The redescription and the repurposing of these documents aim 
at creating what French poet Franck Leibovici calls “une poésie forensique”7 in order to 
recommunicate them in a different way.8 While the substantive ‘forensic’ derives from the 
Latin forum and alludes to the space of negotiation and truth-finding in the public space of 
Roman city, any type of text can be potentially considered forensic9 inasmuch as it relates to a 
particular setting, a legal context or a public and political issue:  
 
Par exemple, mettre en partition des chansons et des musiques de propagande 
djihadiste pour les rendre transportables et étudiables afin d’écrire l’histoire d’un 
conflit depuis les poèmes qui sont produits ; convertir en .doc des archives scannées 
du Sénat américain de filibusters, qui étaient en .jpeg, pour pouvoir les rendre 
manipulables ; mettre en partition chorégraphique des vidéos de milices qui 
s’entraînent ; republier des minutes de procès pour en faire ressortir une dimension 
anthropologique. Toutes ces opérations de conversion, de transcription, de 
republication, permettent de montrer le fonctionnement du document, relèvent de 
l’écriture et sont donc bien pour moi du ressort de la poésie.10 
 
In keeping with its tendency towards experimentalism, renewal and the repurposing of found 
texts, contemporary poetry aims to resort to neither parodistic nor ‘deconditioning’ methods. 
Striving for effectiveness, these forensic poetics consist in ‘republication’, both understood as 
‘publishing again’ and as ‘making public again’, through the redeployment of “forgotten, 
invisible, vanished or censured objects as means to produce new significations”.11 Such 
attempts in the Anglo-American contexts can be found in the works of British verbatim 
playwrights associated with ‘documentary theatre’ (Nicolas Kent, David Hare, Robin Soans) 
who all, each time differently, stage verbatim extracts from war crime trials or current 
affairs;12 or, in in the United States, in the work of neo-conceptualist poets such as Vanessa 
Place, who, while being a criminal appellate attorney, repurposes documents and extracts 
from her work.13 If these practices, in France, do indeed herald a return to praxis and action, 
an interest that resumed after a hiatus of several decades, the rediscovery and critical 
reappraisal of the American objectivist poets, a group formed in the 1930s by Louis Zukofsky 
and comprising Georges Oppen, Carl Rakosi, Lorine Niedecker, Charles Reznikoff, and Basil 
Bunting, played a significant role in the reconfiguration of French poetry. Reznikoff, who 
trained as a lawyer before segueing full-time into writing, is known in France for Testimony: 
The United States (1855-1915): Recitative, which portrays the dark underbelly of America at 
the end of the nineteenth century. Reznikoff’s systematic, factual method consists of copying 
court records related to violent crimes verbatim and then arranging them as verse. As French 
poet Emmanuel Hocquard explains, Reznikoff succeeds in making visible facts in their sheer 
immanence detached from subjective judgments and devoid of sentimentalism, psychologism 
or rhetoric:  
 Reznikoff demande au poète de se contenter de donner à voir, à la manière d’un 
témoin devant un tribunal, sans chercher à influencer le jugement ou l’émotion du 
lecteur. Pour cela il met en place un espace neutre, il ménage une distance sans 
laquelle aucune tentative d’élucidation ne saurait être possible. Cette distance, cet 
écart, est le (théâtre du) travail poétique, un théâtre de mots puisque la langue est à la 
fois le matériau et l’outil quotidiens du poète.14 
 
This neutral distance between the text and the reader, which echoes the one between the 
psychoanalyst and the patient, elicits a reflexive space within discourse which leads to a 
clarification of thought and an objectification of discourse. This method has had a 
considerable influence on iconoclastic contemporary poets, giving rise to two distinct models 
of appropriation: one that is in a clear lineage with Reznikoff, is based on an aesthetic 
understanding of the legal text, and attempts to emphasize its philological aspects (stylistic 
patterns, emphasis on rhythm as essential criteria of ‘literariness’); and another that mainly 
focuses on the ability to re-enact these materials, to transform them into intellectual 
technology by prioritizing  epigraphical concerns (studies of inscription, scriptural economy, 
contextual chains and so on). In this article I shall follow these two approaches by questioning 
the terms and consequences of these engagements through study of the work of Frank Smith 
and Franck Leibovici. I will show the ways in which these appropriations create new poetic 
objects that enable us to reconsider the relations between life, discourse and power whilst 
offering new perspectives on the relationships between literature and politics in French 
contemporary poetry. 
 
Real Lives Played Out in Few Sentences   
  
Frank Smith, who trained initially as a radio producer, has since 2010 published a series of 
books clearly aligned with Reznikoff’s verbatim method. Alongside recycling press coverage 
from English and French newspapers during the Libyan conflict in 2001 in États de faits15 and 
sampling the December 2008 Goldstone report on Gaza in Gaza d’ici-là,16 in Guantanamo 
Smith redescribed the CSRT (Combatant Status Review Tribunal Transcripts), three hundred 
and seventeen formal interrogations conducted on Guantanamo detainees. Some months after 
the War on Terror started in the wake of 9/11 in America, the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base 
became a prison in which several hundred enemy combatants were held. They were allegedly 
linked to Al-Qaeda, and the U.S. military had accused them without formal charge. 
Guantanamo became the theatre of turbulent legal investigations into inhumane treatments 
relying on torture, physical and psychological violence. In January 2006, responding to 
pressure from the American press, the Department of Defense released these verbal trials, 
giving the detainees the possibility of challenging their incarceration in civilian courts. 
Through the frugal practice of quotation, Smith made tangible these infamies, revealing the 
most unsayable, intolerable and shameless of them:  
 
Les Américains m’ont battu si violemment  
que j’ai peur de ne plus pouvoir fonctionner sexuellement.  
Au point que je ne sais pas 
si je serai encore capable de faire l’amour à ma femme. 
Depuis, je suis vraiment très malade, 
je ne contrôle plus mon urination 
et mets parfois du papier toilette 
pour ne pas souiller mon pantalon, 
dit-il encore.17 
 
While appropriating the fleeting, strident words etched in these transcripts, Smith offers a 
specific redescription that can be seen as a translation of one language into language. First, 
Smith translated the original English transcripts into French, transcripts which themselves, in 
part, must have been initially recorded in Pashtu, Uzbek and Arabic. Second, Smith effected a 
translation from one register to another, from one context to another, from the legal to the 
literary. Through a process of selection, copying and pasting, Smith has turned the large 
quantity of data into 29 short, compact chapters, each not exceeding six pages.  
That referential forms of writing such as legal documents could be recognized for their 
literary value and despite their original intention is a theoretical (and ethical) problem that has 
been discussed by Gérard Genette in Fiction et Diction. Genette distinguishes two different 
regimes: the constitutive regime, which refers to Aristotle’s taxonomy and thus includes “la 
fiction narrative ou dramatique et la poésie”,18 and the conditional regime, grounded in 
subjective appreciation and including discarded texts that do not follow the same organization 
of language marked by the seal of ‘literariness’, such as testimonies and scientific and 
philosophical narratives. Yet, in Smith’s work, the shift from document to aesthetic is not 
purely a shift of context, but implies important transformations. Designed to provide an 
account of the conditions of the Cuban Naval Base, Guantanamo offers a new kind of poetic 
object that disrupts the categories of law and poetry, fact and fiction, innocence and guilt. 
 
While Guantanamo maintains a clear and referential relation with the original legal 
transcripts through contextual elements and formal features, Smith has followed a set of 
specific stylistic criteria which disrupt the horizon of expectation associated with these forms 
of writing. He has removed decorative and lyrical patterns of expression in favour of a sober, 
clear idiom (plain grammar, descriptive style), arranging some of these statements into free 
verse. In order to elicit the functional emphasis of the legal mechanism and also to provide a 
dramatic and narrative quality to the interview, the alteration of pronouns plays a crucial role. 
In Guantanamo, ‘on’ appears the most often. As Mark Sanders notes, the use of the 
impersonal pronoun – the third personal neutral pronoun on, difficult to translate in English – 
both “denotes a hearsay” and suggests that “it destabilizes the conditions of possibility for 
properly determining the ‘combatant’ status and the one being interrogated”.19 This ‘hearsay’ 
elicits in fact a type of ‘rumor’, a polyphony across the poem where one voice takes over from 
another. Speech is suddenly reduced to an abstract, indiscernible and impersonal line that 
disrupts hierarchies and identities in favour of a constant process of redefinition. Like 
Blanchot, Smith rejects both the idea of personology in linguistics (the ‘I’ as the ultimate 
foundation) and the Jakobsonian theory of the shifter, described as the emphasis on both the 
location and the object of reference from a subjective point of view. Rather he gives the 
primacy to the third person narrative which refers to the neutral and impersonal voice. 
Blanchot famously analyzed both the paradigmatic and symbolic shift in consciousness 
between an utterance like “Je suis malheureux” and “Il est malheureux”.20 While the former 
example might be seen as what Wittgenstein calls a “private utterance”21 belonging only to 
the person uttering it and resolutely incommunicable, the latter generates a sort of distance 
between language and consciousness. It becomes an external projection of the unfortunate 
circumstances of one’s experience that becomes subsequently tangible for the reader. At the 
same time, the recursion of this pronoun that permeates the entire book provides an intrinsic 
rhythmic quality that reminds the reader of the scheme of the epic:  
 
On demande si le jardin était grand ou confiné à 
une petite arrière-cours. 
On répond que le jardin ne servait qu’à nourrir la 
famille. 
On demande si la maison dans laquelle on habitait, 
n’abritait que la famille proche ou si d’autres personnes 
y logeaient également. 
On répond que non, il n’y avait que la famille. 
On dit que, pourtant, quand on a été capturé, 
d’autres personnes se trouvaient aussi dans la maison 
ou les membres de la famille. On demande si c’est bien ça 
On ne répond pas à la question.(Smith, Guantanamo 16) 
 
Unlike Vanessa Place’s Statements of Facts, where victims are indexically mentioned by their 
name, the lack of nominal identification in Guantanamo reduces victims to single 
Kafkaeasque initials such as ‘S’ and ‘J’. Like the use of ‘on’, these letters do not denote a 
character or a subject but an assemblage. In this context, enunciation is not subordinated to a 
cogito (a subject as a thought and meaning-producing entity) but is diluted in the explosion of 
anonymous and collective voices. By preserving anonymity and identification to bypass 
ethically sensitive issues, Smith succeeds in avoiding the return of psychologism and 
subjectivity: he represents utterances in their sheer immanence in order to preserve only the 
eruption of the particular.  
 As a programmatic quotation from the book suggests – “Nous allons vous poser des 
questions afin de mieux comprendre votre histoire” (Smith, Guantanamo n.p.) – Guantanomo 
both raises the very meaning of what is at stake in conducting an interrogation and the way to 
narrate a story. The two main objectives of an interrogation consist in eliciting information 
and obtaining confirmation of a particular version of an event. The dialectic of 
Question/Answer dialogue based on the polar Yes/No paradigm, symptomatic of legal 




Question: Nous n’avons pas beaucoup d’informations 
vous concernant, les seuls renseignements dont nous 
disposons proviennent du « Procès-Verbal Non Clas- 
sifié ». (…) 
  Êtes-vous citoyen du Kazakhstan ? 
  Réponse : Oui 
  Question : Pourriez-vous nous dire pourquoi vous 
avez quitté, avec votre famille, le Kazakhstan pour 
l’Afghanistan ? 
  Réponse : Il n’y a pas de travail au Kazakhstan. 
Gagner sa vie y est difficile.(Smith, Guantanamo 6) 
 
Smith does not, however, attempt to force the reader to sympathize with the detainee, but 
rather reveals the mechanisms of accusation to the point of absurdity. In Guantanamo, the law 
is indeed presented as empty, without content to the extent that no one really has any idea of 
the nature of guilt: one detainee asks the interrogator “Il y a une question à laquelle vous 
n’avez/pas répondu. Une fois de plus, j’aimerais savoir d’où/le greffier tire ses 
accusations/Elles sont fausses”(Smith, Guantanamo 150); another protests against the 
president of the tribunal, “Cette femme, avec ses cinq ou six/accusations, j’aimerais vous 
demander, où est-ce qu’elle a déniché ces informations-là ? Est-ce qu’elle détient/la moindre 
preuve ?” (Smith, Guantanamo 130). That the law can only be expressed by a given 
mechanism, and that the object of the accusation always remains unknowable, reveals a sort 
of transcendence. This idea clearly echoes Kant’s theory of law as a pure form of universality 
and moral imperative. For Kant, the law is seen as the highest instance and is not connected to 
sensible or intelligible objects as in Plato, but instead to practical reason. In that sense, the law 
is not linked to an internal process that would reveal to human beings which objectives to 
follow to be good. It is external, as it provides a form that one must follow to be moral. Gilles 
Deleuze has analyzed the nature and the consequences of this imperative in regards to guilt 
through the identification of three paradigmatic elements: its a priori aspect (“la culpabilité 
doit être l’effet l’a-priori qui correspond à la transcendance, pour tout ou par chacun, fautif ou 
innocent”); its necessary aspect (“la loi n’ayant pas d’objet, mais étant pure forme, elle ne 
peut pas être du domaine de la connaissance, mais exclusivement de la nécessité pratique 
absolue”); and, finally, its performative aspect (“la loi ne se détermine qu’en s’énonçant, et ne 
s’énonce que dans l’acte du châtiment”).22 Through redescription, Smith makes tangible, on 
numerous occasions, this link between the law, guilt and what is unknowable, and the 
performative aspect of utterances culminating in nonsense: 
 
    Président du Tribunal: Je n’ai plus de questions, 
Quelqu’un voudrait interroger le détenu ? 
Détenu : il y a une question à laquelle vous n’avez 
pas répondu. Une fois de plus, j’aimerais savoir d’où 
le greffier tire ses accusations. Elles sont fausses. 
  Président du Tribunal : C’est le gouvernement qui 
a fourni ces informations au greffier, et le greffier les 
présente pour le gouvernement. Nous ne savons pas 
exactement d’où elles proviennent pour le moment. 
souvenez-vous, le greffier a indiqué qu’elle avait des 
informations classifiées à présenter. Il nous incombe 
de considérer les informations, les commentaires et 
les déclarations que vous fournissez tout autant que 
ce que nous présente le gouvernement. 
Détenu : Je suis une petite personne. Bien entendu, 
c’est votre travail, et c’est vous qui décidez. Mais je  
pense à ces cinq ou six allégations. Si la moindre 
d’entres elles était crédible, ça serait moins bizarre. Mais 
elles sont toutes si fausses ! Personne n’a le temps de 
nourrir sa famille tout en faisant ce que vous  m’accusez 
d’avoir fait! (Smith, Guantanamo 150) 
  
The repurposing of these legal documents into a poetic context reveals a tension between, on 
the one hand, a fraudulent and manipulative use of language within the legal machine and, on 
the other, ordinary language, the natural communication that brings people together. The so-
called objectivity of the legal system confronts the collective subjectivities and loses its 
currency with its lack of clear evidence, suggestions and inconsistencies. What is given to 
read is a dismantling of the mechanisms of the legal arena that elicit how it constantly informs 
and misinforms, directs and redirects the investigation. What this nonsense reveals is a 
political question that elicits the expression of two modes of desire: the transcendence of 
power, with its mechanisms of registration and economy of punishment; and the immanence 
of the detainee and their hopes. The final chapter makes this link particularly tangible:  
 
Président du Tribunal: Où voulez-vous aller? 
Détenu: Je voudrais aller aux États-Unis. Me rendre 
 aux États-Unis, c’est ce que je souhaiterais le plus au 
monde. Et si les États-Unis ne m’acceptent pas, alors 
je voudrais rentrer chez moi, en Ouzbékistan. (Smith, Guantanamo 
152) 
 
This final statement invites the reader to generate a differential reading of the entire book: it 
does not invite an ironic or cynical reading, but reflects how the legal machinery has impacted 
the consciousness of the detainee who seems to have forgotten that he is currently on 
American soil. It reveals an active mode of existence that rejects the slavery of passive 
affection (static suffering associated with victimhood) in favour of an active affection (a 
power to act) which elicits a reexamination of the relations between victim and oppressor, 
power and desire. Through a process of defamiliarization and a transformation of the original 
materials, Smith invites the reader to experience how the true is a moment of the false, how 
falsification elicits effects of truth to such an extent that this impermeability abolishes 
distinctions between fictional and factual regimes. What this poetic object reveals is an artistic 
artefact that becomes a tool to unravel new representations of public issues. The shift from the 
legal to the literary masks two central points, however: first, the chronology and progression 
of the trial (frequent analepses, lack of contextual features) whose advent is in itself the event; 
second, the hierarchies, agencies and actors involved on the stage of power, who all become 
neutralized. Through the alteration of pronouns, the anonymization and versification, Smith 
draws attention to the intrinsic strangeness of legal documents but, through redescription, he 
makes strategic use of them, bringing to the fore ethical and emotional perspectives on public 
issues.  
 The Working of Power on Lives 
In a different way, Franck Leibovici considers redescription to be a technology of writing 
within the frame of an action theory that enables the construction of salient institutional 
ecosystems. Rejecting the idea of a language cut off from wordly purposes, Leibovici’s poetry 
consists in repurposing found texts whilst providing new modes of classifying data.23 In 
collaboration with Julien Seroussi, a sociologist, legal scholar and specialist in International 
Criminal Justice, in 2016 Leibovici published a large volume entitled Bogoro, referring to the 
‘Bogoro massacre’ which occurred on February 2003. The assault was an attack on the 
Bogoro village in the Democratic Republic of Congo by the Nationalist and Integrationist 
Front and the Front of Patriotic Resistance of Ituri. These fighters, who also included 
children, attacked Bogoro with spears, arrows, mortars, automatic weapons and machetes, 
killing at least 200 civilians, imprisoning survivors alongside corpses, and using women and 
young girls as sexual slaves. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, two rebel leaders, 
have since been charged by the International Criminal Court (ICC) with war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. Drawing entirely on the legal transcripts and materials of the first 
trial held at the ICC in 2007, Bogoro aims at redescribing the scriptural economy of the 
document to reveal its mechanisms, ecology and process:  
 
bogoro suit la chronologie d’un des premiers procès de la cours pénale internationale à 
la haye (…) le texte est compose de quatre parties: la première partie donne la parole 
aux témoins du procureur, anciens enfants-soldats, à la fois victimes de la guerre et 
participants actifs aux massacres; la seconde donne la parole aux victimes; la 
troisième, aux témoins de la défense ; la quatrième rend compte, dans un retournement 
un peu théâtral, de la crédibilité des témoins telle qu’elle fut évaluée dans le jugement 
de la cours.24 
  
While the trial follows the Audi Alterem Partem principle (‘listen to the other side’), which 
consists in giving a party the right to confront the witnesses for the defense in order to 
challenge the evidence presented by the other party, Bogoro focuses less on the judgement or 
the conclusion of the trial than on the verbal interactions and the functioning of the legal 
arena. In that sense, Leibovici and Seroussi neither seek to provide a denunciation of the 
massacre, nor to intervene, nor to add to or comment on any aspect of the trial, but instead to 
offer a sketch (based on scale, displays, mobility) of the dysfunctional stage of power. 
Leibovici maintains a significant number of formal features present in the editorial 
architecture of the transcripts: the format of the book is analogous to the original dimensions 
of the legal documents; the documents include ‘case numbers’ or ‘headings’ such as ‘ICC-
01/04-01/07-T-220-Red-FRA WT 22-11-2010 1/78 RM T’; the numbering is based on the 
original stenographic court reports, so that the reader notices that, throughout the trial, the 
numbering shifts from 1-25 to 1-28. All these elements play an indexical function – a form of 
‘re-familarization’ – which reminds the reader of the official transcripts. As with Smith, 
Leibovici’s redescription implies a process of selecting utterances and then reconfiguring 
them. First, Leibovici has gathered elements that were initially disjointed to create two 
narratives that in fact belong to the same thread: the former relates to the attack committed in 
Ituri (in black in the text), and the latter to the technological glitches of the trial which 
disrupted its rules and operations (in grey in the text). Second, he has added a tabular system 
(‘tags’ in red in the text) throughout the transcripts and created an index following Zukofsky’s 
alphanumerical device – a redescription of a redescription – that enables the reader to check, 
compare, and relate disparate elements in the reading process.  
 Through redescription, Leibovici is interested in revealing the scenography of the trial, 
and especially the disruption at play during the trial. Many aspects obfuscate the workings of 
the law during this trial, which impinges on positions and interpretations. As the barristers and 
judges speak to the witnesses, the translation is piped into the headphones of the witness and 
the accused in a language that they choose; the answer is then piped in French to the court and 
public gallery. While some parts of the translation proceed smoothly, there are many 
problems caused by technological glitches. These include, “(se corrige l’interprète)”, 
“l’interprète swahili-français: monsieur le président franchement, la/cabine a des difficultés à 
comprendre, là (…) il faut que/vous parliez lentement, comme vous le faites, peut-être plus 
fort parce que ce n’est/pas aussi simple pour l’interprète d’interpréter vos propos que lorsqu’il 
s’agit/de raconteur des événements” or “et des bourdonnements extrêmement gênants”. What 
matters is thus neither capturing paralinguistic signals, such as intonation and pitch, nor 
focusing on extralinguistic features, such as smiles, nods, the raising of eyebrows, and so on, 
but dramatizing the scenography of the trial:  
 
22 (recours à un pseudonyme, altération de sa voix  distorsion de 
 23 son image ;    huit clos lorsqu’il entrera et sortira de la 
 24 salle d’audience.) 
 
8 l’installation d’un rideau permettant d’éviter tout contact visuel entre le témoin 
0280 
9 et les deux accusés,   les accusés verront sur leur écran le visage 
du 
 10 témoin. (Leibovici and Seroussi 19) 
 
The division of segments is not based on the delivery or on units as in conversation analysis, 
although it happens that after a long pause the stenographer goes back to the following line, 
but, rather, on the amount of speech allocated per line. The duplication of the layout and its 
alteration has three functions: first, the fact that the numbering breaks with chronological and 
rational succession reveals what has been selected and deleted by Leibovici. Second, the 
cleaning of certain units and their selection dramatizes some salient elements of the 
interaction to the detriment of others, considered by the poet as secondary. Third, the 
discrepancy between syntactic/rhythmic and graphic units – the presence of blank spaces 
which reflect or break speech – unavoidably reminds the reader of the formal aspects of 
poetry:  
 
12       des gens criaient, les 
13 gens pleuraient. Ils étaient découpés en machette. 
14 par la suite, vers le soir, les pillages, les crépitements des balles ont cessé. 
15          j’avais pensé 
16 que tout était fini. (Leibovici and Seroussi 163) 
 
Beyond the depiction of violence and the series of technological glitches that obfuscate the 
workings of the law, the cleansing effect of the original transcript reflects the numerous 
cultural and linguistic obstacles faced by the judges and other participants. Although the 
judges did their best to avoid ethnocentric or neo-colonialist positions and interpretations, 
Leibovici’s redescription reveals the distance that separated the Western apparatus of justice 
grounded in rational reasoning from the cosmogony of the witnesses and victims. Notions of 
space, age, kinship, magic and fetish are not easily tackled and barely approximate to the idea 
of a global justice. The arena is, indeed, repeatedly confronted with linguistic ambiguities to 
the extent that lawyers constantly reiterate or rephrase questions failing to take into account 
the wider social context and the embedding of ideology in language:  
 
24  q. monsieur le témoin, qui…qui était la personne qui vous donnait ces fétiches? 
25  r. il n’y a pas une personne spécifique qui était chargée de nous donner les/ 
1  fétiches. c’était une personne de bonne volonté. un villageois qui est dirigé par 
son 
2  esprit (…).(Leibovici and Seroussi 32) 
  
What this redescription discloses is an anthropological bias in relationship to language. 
Claude Lévi-Strauss, after Marcel Mauss, called this “mana”; that is, an entity that is so 
general in language that it entails the most diverse signifiers. The encounter between the court 
and the participants thus unmasks two conceptions of language: one that is referential, 
autonomous, indexical; and another that is a “signifiant flottant”25 and that cannot be 
separated from a context, a tribe or a community and that has a psychological-cultural 
meaning. This split between two regimes of significance signals an imbalance between 
knowledge/language, human being/ world, the individual/ the institution, oral culture/literate 
culture. The result raises the issue of truth and reconciliation. The Court struggled to 
determine the level of responsibility of participants for their crimes. It is partly because the 
conditions of felicity of a testimony are not the same as in Europe: in Ituri, a witness who 
asserts that they are telling the truth, tells the truth of his group, which suggests that he would 
describe the events experienced by his group whilst not necessarily being a direct witness. 
The same applies to toponymical or topographic descriptions that also undermined the 
charges laid by the prosecutor against the accused.26 In addition, judges did not consider that 
fetishes (power objects, charms, spells) would play such a significant role alongside the 
military and the political aspects, nor that witnesses would refuse to testify for fear of the 
fetishes. 
 Yet this bias about the characterization of the mode of liability with regard to Germain 
Katanga was challenged within the legal arena, creating a conflict not only between historical 
and legal evidence, “les conclusions factuelles” and “les conclusions juridiques”, but also 
between two conceptions of writing that the last chapter of Bogoro reveals. This gap elicits 
two distinct modes of liability, whether ones refers to ‘Common Law’ (rooted in the legal 
system of England) or the ‘Roman law’ (referring to the legal system of Ancient Rome). In 
the first instance, at the end of their inquiry the prosecutor delivers a narrative to the judges. If 
the narrative is reliable and resists the counter arguments of the defense, the defendant is 
convicted. In this paradigm, all the depositions are recorded and typed by a stenographer, to 
whom the judge constantly refers. In this trial, however, evidence was not always reliable as 
the prosecutor mainly focused on testimonies, in themselves hardly credible (no basis for 
findings beyond reasonable doubt). That is why, after the closing arguments of the parties, the 
Belgian judge Van den Wyngaert was unable to find sufficient evidence that Katanga had 
served as a military commander and acquitted him as an ‘indirect perpetrator’. In his 
dissenting opinion, the French Judge Bruno Cotte considered the trial unfair, lessened the 
allegations against Katanga by accusing him of facilitating the supply of weapons used by 
Local Ngiti militia, and convicted him pursuant on the basis of article 25(3) of the Rome 
Statute. The chamber concluded that Katanga was found guilty of four counts of war crimes 
(murder, attacking a civilian population, destruction of property, pillaging) and one count of 
crime against humanity as the last document of Bogoro testifies. This reveals two different 
modes of liability based on two approaches to writing: while, in Common Law, truth is based 
on the juxtaposition of transcripts that play a referential role, in Roman Law truth is not based 
on recordings or transcriptions but on reformulations and on the ‘ultimate conviction’ of the 
judge who summarizes and dictates statements to the court clerk.  In redescribing these 
transcripts, Leibovici reveals the theatre of the conflict with the actors, agencies, disruptions 
and upheavals that shape human action and influence decisions based on the scriptural 
economy of these documents. In this respect, Rahma Khazam is right to draw a parallel 
between Leibovici’s practice and what Benjamin Buchloh calls “the aesthetic of 
administration”, a practice located in 1960s Conceptual Art according to which artists aimed 
to “administrer le travail et la production (plutôt qu’à produire)”.27 Leibovici’s work can be 
indeed thought of in these terms when he explains that “écrire, ce n’est plus du tout produire 
des énoncés mais c’est essayer de reprendre plus généralement toute la chaine de l’opération 
d’écriture de l’amont à l’aval (…) reconnecter des éléments disparates : champs du savoir, 
expériences. Cette reconnexion rend possibles des gestes qui étaient empêchés 
jusqu’alors”(Leibovici and Terroni, “Sur quoi opère l’art”). For Leibovici, the poetics lies in 
the invention of a new apparatus. By resorting to different scales and visual organization to 
classify the flow of information, the poetic object points towards ethical, historical, legal and 
linguistic spaces that figure and translate logical multiplicities. Through redescription, 
Leibovici invents a new poetic object which seeks to represent, from the inside, how the legal 
arena operates, how actors perceive and categorize events. This ‘emic’ paradigm, as opposed 
to the etic one that uses external categories to analyze a situation, only comes from the 
insider’s view of reality and provides a sort of immanence that shapes the conditions of 
existence.  
 
 In an age of post-truth politics characterized by falsifying of facts and instant 
emotions, the repurposing and redescription of legal texts in poetic contexts provides an 
antidote to contemporary modes of subjectification. By virtue of retelling, contemporary 
French poets aim at endowing their readership with a new intellectual and perceptual 
apparatus to tackle the political issues of our time. There is no doubt that the redescription of 
these forensic texts generates a shift from a ‘matter of fact’ to a ‘matter of concern’, but it is 
clear that these poets face a new intellectual, ethical and creative challenge: how to shift 
towards the politics of things to re-map politics? How to create an efficient ‘object-oriented’ 
democracy? Bruno Latour has called for the emergence of a Dingpolitik, as opposed to the 
current Realpolitik; that is, the creation of a space that is no longer static or based on a 
separation between the object and the thing but that involves parties, people and things 
assembled. Inventing new techniques to represent information – a new object – that would 
both combine the assemblage and the assembly, the object and its agency, but also raise a 
public issue, seems to have become an aim for many contemporary artists seeking to provide 
a new representation of the political.28 As Leibovici explains, the repurposing of legal texts 
into a poetic context enables him to enhance what the law considers residual or secondary 
within its mechanisms of production: 
 
alors que le droit travaille à arracher une affaire de ses contingences anecdotiques pour 
le rattacher à des textes et des catégories qui permettront de la qualifier juridiquement, 
les poétiques forensiques visent, en parallèle à ces transformations et ces 
qualifications, à faire surgir des acteurs inattendus, qui peuplaient ces écologies 
jusqu’alors invisibilisées, pour modifier la composition de l’arène du tribunal et 
augmenter les populations convoquées […] voir comment des documents sont gros 
d’une population, et de quoi est faite cette population.(Leibovici and Terroni 35) 
 
Whether it consists in ‘re-describing’ or ‘re-editing’ a document by other means by following 
specific modalities (musical scores, for instance) or ‘re-transcribing’ audio recordings via the 
tools of conversation to slow down and make tangible aspects seen but unnoticed, these 
practices seek to invent new regimes of visibility of the political. Through their works, these 
two poets show that redescription is an inquiry in itself. If the epistemologies of law differ 
from poetry, the work of these two poets propose that new forms of discourse can be created 
when disciplines come together. By transforming the properties of these transcripts, Smith 
shows that poetry enables the reader to generate a critical distance towards contemporary 
modes of subjectification as his work gives rise to a powerful irony directed at the credulity 
with which prevailing story-telling is accepted. Leibovici who, by contrast, does not 
transform these documents to produce a new text, reveals that redescription raises the issue of 
accountability and liability. Influenced by the techniques of ethnomethodology, his poetry 
consists in redescribing the organization of legal activities by making them visible and 
reportable. In doing so, he shows how new layouts of these documents inform our 
interpretation of them, bringing our attention to elements seen but unnoticed, to the often 
mundane interactions and contradictions that occur in the legal arena. In both cases, these 
practices aim neither at ‘aestheticizing’ these legal texts nor at revealing their intrinsic poetic 
values according to predetermined and traditional aesthetic categories. Aesthetic experience is 
here understood in pragmatic terms, that is to say in relationship to experience situated in 
practical and social life. By not separating aesthetic from intellect, Smith and Leibovici show, 
like John Dewey, that aesthetic experience is based on observation and cognition. Reading 
these texts implies reflective action, engagement with the world and distance. Of course, the 
book is not the only space in which the assemblage and assembly can coincide: these poetic 
documents, which can be interpreted through a live performance, read in a museum or simply 
exhibited,29 recreate hybrid agoras through the convergence of political, symbolical and 
material assemblages. These legal documents, transformed into strange poems, not only 
reveal the workings of power on lives and the discourses which come out of them, but also 
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